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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based representation of games, in order
to propose a compact representation for multi-party games in game theory.
Our method is inspired by concepts in process theory and process algebra.
In addition, we introduce an algorithm whose input is a game in the form of
process algebra (proposed in this paper) and as an output, finds the Nash
equilibrium of the game in linear space complexity.
Keywords: extensive games, Nash equilibrium, process theory, process
algebra
1 Introduction
Extensive representation form of a game is a directed graph whose nodes are
players, and edges are actions. Assuming that the game has n agents, and each
agent has two actions available, the game can be represented by a graph of size
O(2n).
However, by explaining the behavior of each agent individually using an ade-
quate process (called process-game), and obtaining the whole game through par-
allel composition these process-games, it is possible to represent the same game
in O(n) space. We take advantage of process algebra to define process-game and
the appropriate notion of parallel composition for them.
The word “process” refers to the behavior of a system which is a set of actions
that are performed in the system and the order of their executions. The pro-
cess theory makes it possible to model the behavior of a system with enormous
complexity through modeling the behavior of its components [Middelburg and
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Reniers, 2005]. By taking advantages of process algebra–automating calculations
and running algorithms using parallel computing techniques–we can code the pro-
cess theory terms and definitions [Fokkink, 2007], [Tadjouddine, 2008]. On the
other hand, a game is a system and its behavior is established by the behavior of
all of its players (components). Hence, the game could be studied and formally
modeled as interactive process [Van Benthem, 2002].
Moving along this path in formal methods, in order to reduce the representa-
tion of games with lots of players, we modify the process theory in an appropriate
manner to provide a model called “process-game” that encompasses both process
theory and game theory notions. This proposed process algebraic model makes it
possible to have a compact representation for extensive games–specially in social
extensive games which have local interaction–via appropriate parallel composition
(section 3).
Also, there are other efforts to reduce the representation of games with very
high number of players. In comparison with graph-based representation that is
proposed to reach the same goal [Kearns, Littman, and Singh, 2001], our proposed
model, facilitates the reduction of representation of games in the formal method.
Eventually, to manipulate process-game model efficiently, we propose an algo-
rithm to find the equilibrium path of games in linear space complexity by using
a revision of depth first search and backward induction (section 4).
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some preliminary concepts in game and process theory.
2.1 Game-Theoretic Concepts
In this part we briefly review definitions and concepts of strategic and extensive
games with perfect information which appeared in the literature using the same
notations as in [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994], Page 89.
A strategic game is a model of decision-making such that decision-makers
choose their plan simultaneously from their possible actions, once and for all.
Definition 1 (Strategic Game). A strategic game consists of:
• A finite set of players N
• for each player i ∈ N a nonempty set of actions Ai
• for each player i ∈ N a payoff function Πi : A1 × · · · ×An → R.
If for each player i’s action set Ai is finite, the the game is finite.
Example 1 (prisoner’s dilemma). Two members of a criminal gang are arrested
and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speak-
ing to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they don’t have
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enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sen-
tence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer
each prisoner a Faustian bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either
to betray (B) the other, by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to
cooperate (C) with the other by remaining silent. Here’s how it goes:
• If A and B both betray the other, each of them serves 2 years in prison
• If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3
years in prison (and vice versa)
• If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve 1 year in prison
(on the lesser charge)
The above situation is shown as a strategic game in Figure 1.
B C
B (-2,-2) (0,-3)
C (-3,0) (-1,-1)
Figure 1: strategic representation of Example 1
The set of players is N = {1, 2}. Possible actions for each player come from the
set of A1 = A2 = {B,C}. Each cell in the above table corresponds to a strategy
profile and shows the resulting payoffs. A strategy profile is a set of strategies
for all players which fully specifies all actions in a game. A strategy profile must
include one and only one strategy for every player. In the cell, the first value is
the player 1’s payoff and the player 2’s payoff is the second one.
One of the most common solution concepts in game theory is Nash equilibrium.
This notion captures a steady state which no player wants to deviate from the
current state if action of the other players are fixed (therefore, all player choose
their action in a rational manner).
Notation 1. For each strategy profile s, s−i shows the action of all players,
except player i.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium of a strategic game Γ =
〈N, (Ai), (Πi)〉 is a strategy profile s∗ with the property that for every player
i ∈ N we have
Πi(s
∗
−i, s
∗
i ) ≥ Πi(s∗−i, si),∀si ∈ Ai.
Example 2. In Example 1, strategy profile (B,B) is a Nash equilibrium. Be-
cause, If player 1 deviates from action B to C, his payoff decreases from −2 to
−3 in strategy profile (C,B). Therefore, he has not any motivation to deviate
from the state (B,B). Also, because of symmetry, we can say the same reason for
player 2 to have not any motivation to deviate from the current state. Therefore,
strategy profile (B,B) is a Nash equilibrium in this game.
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Another form of games, which is the pivot of discussion in this paper, is
extensive game. In this form, decision-makers act sequentially (unlike strategic
game).
Definition 3 (Extensive Game with Perfect Information). An extensive game
with perfect information is defined by a four-tuple 〈N,H,P, (Πi)〉 which has the
following properties:
• A set N of players
• A set H of sequences (finite or infinite) that satisfies the following three
properties:
– The empty sequence ∅ (the empty history representing the start of the
game) is a member of H.
– If (ak)k=1,...,K ∈ H (where K may be infinite) and positive integer
L < K then (ak)k=1,...,L ∈ H.
– If an infinite sequence (ak)k=1,...,∞ satisfies (ak)k=1,...,L ∈ H for every
positive integer L then (ak)k=1,...,∞ ∈ H.
Each member of H is a history and each term of a history is an action which
is taken by a player. A history (ak)k=1,...,K ∈ H is terminal if it is infinite
or there is no aK+1 such that (ak)k=1,...,K+1 ∈ H. The set of all terminal
histories is denoted by Z.
• A function P (the player function) that assigns to each nonterminal history
(each member of H\Z) a member of N , P (h) returns the player who takes
an action after the history h (P : H\Z → N).
• A function Π (the payoff function) that assigns to each terminal history
(each member of Z) a member of R|N |(Π : Z → R|N |, Πi(z) is player i’s
payoff in terminal history z ∈ Z).
An extensive game with perfect information is finite if and only if the set
H of possible histories is finite. Throughout this paper, whenever we use the
term extensive games, we mean extensive games with perfect information. In an
extensive game, P (h) chooses an action after any nonterminal history h from the
set A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H} where (h, a) means a history h followed by an action
a which is one of the actions available to the player who moves after h.
Definition 4 (Strategy). A strategy of player i ∈ N in an extensive game
〈N,H,P, (Πi)〉 is a function that assigns an action from A(h) to each h ∈ H\Z
(nonterminal history) for which P (h) = i.
The outcome of a strategy profile s is a terminal history which is constructed
by s, and is denoted by O(s).
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Example 3. Two people (“husband” and “wife”) are buying items for a dinner
party. The husband buys either fish (F) or meat (M) for the meal; the wife buys
either red wine (R) or white wine (W). Both people prefer red wine with meat and
white wine with fish, rather than either of the opposite combinations. However,
the husband prefers meat over fish, while the wife prefers fish over meat. Assume
that the husband buys the meal and tells his wife what was bought; his wife then
buys some wine. If we want to consider this problem as an extensive game with
perfect information we can determine its component like
• N = {Wife,Husband}
• Possible actions for husband are a member of the set AHusband = {F,M}
and wife’s actions come from AWife = {R,W}. So in this example, Z is a
set of sequences which are started by the action F or M and terminated by
R or W . All possible histories H and terminal histories Z are shown below:
H = {(∅), (F ), (M), (F,R), (F,W ), (M,R), (M,W )}
Z = {(F,R), (F,W ), (M,R), (M,W )}
• For each h ∈ H\Z , P (h) is as follows:
P ((∅)) = Husband , P ((F )) = (Wife), P ((M)) = (Wife)
• We can represent the preferences as utility-based payoffs:
ΠHusband(M,R) = 2, ΠHusband(F,W ) = 1,
ΠHusband(F,R) = ΠHusband(M,W ) = 0
ΠWife(M,R) = 1, ΠWife(F,W ) = 2, ΠWife(F,R) = ΠWife(M,W ) = 0
Nash equilibrium is a common solution concept for extensive games. This
concept is defined in the following definition.
Definition 5. The strategy profile s∗ in an extensive game with perfect informa-
tion is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N we have:
Πi(O(s
∗)) ≥ Πi(O(si, s∗−i)) for every strategy si of player i.
The notion of a Nash equilibrium ignores the sequential structure of an ex-
tensive form game and treats strategies as if they were choices made once and for
all. To refine the Nash equilibrium definition is defined a new notion of subgame
perfect equilibrium (see [Narahari, 2014], Chapter 3).
Definition 6. Let Γ = 〈N,H,P, (Πi)〉 be an extensive game with perfect infor-
mation. The subgame of Γ that follows the history h ∈ H\Z (a nonterminal
history) is the extensive game Γ(h) = 〈N,H|h, P |h,Π|h〉 where all sequences
h′ of actions for which (h, h′) ∈ H are in the set H|h and vice versa, P |h is
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the same as function P but its domain come from the set H|h, and for each
h′, h′′ ∈ Z|h (the set Z|h consists of all the terminal histories in the set H|h) is
defined that Πi|h(h′) > Πi|h(h′′) if and only if Πi(h, h′) > Πi(h, h′′) (note that
(h, h′), (h, h′′) ∈ Z).
In a moment, we can define the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium as
mentioned before, using the notion of subgame.
Definition 7. The strategy profile s∗ in an extensive game with perfect infor-
mation is a subgame perfect equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N and every
nonterminal history h ∈ H\Z for which P (h) = i we have:
Πi|h(Oh(s∗|h)) ≥ Πi|h(Oh(si, s∗−i|h)) for every strategy si of player i
in the subgame Γ(h).
Most often, an extensive game is shown by a tree and marked the subgame
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the game on the tree as in [Narahari, 2014],
Chapter 3 (for a better understanding see Example 3 and Figure 2).
Husband
Wife
M F
R W
Wife
R W
2,1 0,0 0,0 1,2
Figure 2: game of Example 3 which is depicted as a tree and shown the SPNEs by fat
links
The definition of extensive game with perfect information (Definition 3) can
be generalized by allowing simultaneous moves of the players. This type of games
is called extensive game with imperfect information, in this paper. An extensive
game with imperfect information is determined by a quintuple 〈N,H,P, (Ii), (Πi)〉.
Relative to the definition of an extensive game with perfect information, the new
element is the collection (Ii)i∈N of information partitions. For each player i ∈ N ,
Ii is a partition of {h ∈ H : P (h) = i} with the property that A(h) = A(h′)
whenever h and h′ are in the same member of the partition. For Ii ∈ Ii, we
denote by A(Ii) the set A(h) and by P (Ii), the player P (h) for any h ∈ Ii (Ii is
the information partition of player i; a set Ii ∈ Ii is an information set of player
i) [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994].
We define a variant of the battle of sexes (BoS) game (Example 3) as an
example of extensive games with imperfect information.
Example 4. Assume in Example 3, that wife decides to hold a dinner party or
not. If she decides not to hold the dinner party, the game ends and nothing hap-
pens. On the other hand, there are games similar to Example 3 where players
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move simultaneously instead of moving sequentially. As shown in Figure 3, si-
multaneous moving is specified by dashed line and means the wife does not know
that she is in which history.
Husband
Wife
M F
R W R W
2,1 0,0 0,0 1,2
Wife
H N
0,0
Figure 3: game of the Example 4 which is depicted as a tree and dashed line means
wife and husband move simultaneously on that level (as an example of extensive game
with imperfect information).
Formally, we have P (∅) = P (H,M) = P (H,F ) = Wife, P (H) = Husband,
IWife = {{∅}, {(H,M), (H,F )}}, and IHusband = {{H}}.
Definition 8. A pure strategy of player i ∈ N in an extensive game with imper-
fect information 〈N,H,P, (Ii), (Πi)〉 is a function that assigns an action in A(Ii)
to each information set Ii ∈ Ii.
2.2 Process Theory
The notion of a transition system can be considered to be the fundamental notion
for the description of process behavior [Middelburg and Reniers, 2005]. In this
section we state some abstract formal definitions regarding transition systems and
specify the notion of authentication using these definitions.
Definition 9. A transition system T is a quintuple (S,A,→, ↓, s0) where
• S is a set of states,
• A is a set of actions containing an internal action τ ,
• →⊆ S ×A× S is a set of transitions,
• ↓⊆ S is a set of successfully terminating states,
• s0 ∈ S is the initial state.
The set ⊆ S × A? × S shows generalized transitions of T (A? is a set of
all possible chains of actions from A). A state s ∈ S is called reachable state
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of T if there is σ ∈ A? such that s0
σ s. The set of all reachable states of a
transition system T is denoted by reach(T ). We define act(T ) = {a ∈ A | ∃s, s′ ∈
reach(T ) (s, a, s′) ∈→}. In the sequel, we assume that every transition system
T is connected, i.e., reach(T ) = S, and act(T ) = A. If S and A are finite, T is
called a finite transition system.
Notation 2. We refer to (s, a, s′) ∈→ by s a→ s′.
We define Trace = {σ ∈ A? | ∃s′ ∈ S s0
σ s′}. If there exists n ∈ N such that
∀σ ∈ Trace (|σ| ≤ n), where |σ| is the length of the sequence σ, then T is called
a finite-depth transition system. If for every s ∈ S, {(s, a, s′) ∈→| a ∈ A, s′ ∈ S}
is finite, then T is called a finite-branching transition system. By the notation τ ,
we refer to the silent action.
Proposition 1. If T is both a finite-depth and a finite-branching transition sys-
tem, then it is a finite transition system.
Proof. It is straightforward. 
Definition 10. Let T = (S,A,→, ↓, s0) be a transition system. Then T is de-
terministic if the following condition holds: Whenever s0
σ s and s0
σ s′, then
s = s′.
Definition 11. Let A be a set of actions. A communication function on A is a
partial function γ : A× A→ A such that for any a, b ∈ A: γ(τ, a) is not defined,
and if γ(a, b) is defined then γ(b, a) is defined and γ(a, b) = γ(b, a). The image of
γ is shown by Cγ . We define Hγ = A−Cγ . Assume that if γ(a, b) is defined then
both a, b ∈ Hγ .
Definition 12 (Parallel Composition). Let T = (S,A,→, ↓, s0) and T ′ = (S′, A′,→′
, ↓′, s′0) be two transition systems, and γ a communication function on a set of
actions that includes A ∪ A′. The parallel composition of T and T ′ under γ,
written T ‖ T ′, is the transition system (S′′, A′′,→′′, ↓′′, s′′0) where
• S′′ = S × S′,
• A′′ = A ∪A′ ∪ {γ(a, a′) | a ∈ A, a′ ∈ A′}
• →′′ is the smallest subset of S′′ ×A′′ × S′′ such that:
- if s1
a→ s2 and s′ ∈ S′, then (s1, s′) a→ ′′(s2, s′),
- if s′1
b→ s′2 and s ∈ S, then (s, s′1) b→ ′′(s, s′2),
- if s1
a→ s2, s′1 b→ s′2, and γ(a, b) is defined, then (s1, s′1)
γ(a,b)→ ′′(s2, s′2),
• ↓′′=↓ × ↓′,
• s′′0 = (s0, s′0).
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Definition 13 (Encapsulation). Let T = (S,A,→, ↓, s0) be a transition system.
Let H be a set of actions. The encapsulation of T with respect to H, written as
δH(T ), is the transition system (S
′, A′,→′, ↓′, s′0) where
• S′ = S, A′ = A, ↓′=↓, s′0 = s0 and
• →′=→ ∩(S × (A−H)× S).
Assume T1 and T2 are two processes , and execute them in parallel. Then
for H = A− Cγ , the encapsulation of the process T1 ‖ T2 makes the processes to
communicate. It means the difference between T1 ‖ T2 and δH(T1 ‖ T2) is that in
the second process only communication actions exist.
Proposition 2. If T and T ′ are two transition systems, and T is finite-depth,
then δHγ (T ‖ T ′) is finite-depth.
Proof. It is straightforward. 
Definition 14. Assume two transition systems T = (S,A,→, ↓, s0) and T ′ =
(S′, A′,→′, ↓′, s′0), and for s ∈ S, let l(s) = {(s, a, t) ∈→| a ∈ A, t ∈ S}, and
for every s′ ∈ S′, l′(s′) = {(s′, b, t′) ∈→′| b ∈ A′, t′ ∈ S′}. We say T, T ′ are
communication finite-branching with respect to communication function γ, if for
any (s, s′) ∈ S × S′ the set {((s a→ t), (s′ b→ ′t)) ∈ l(s)× l(s′) | γ(a, b) is defined}
is finite.
Proposition 3. If two transition systems T = (S,A,→, ↓, s0) and T ′ = (S′, A′,→′
, ↓′, s′0) are communication finite-branching with respect to a communication func-
tion γ, then δHγ (T ‖ T ′) is finite-branching.
Proof. It is straightforward. 
3 The Processes of Games
In this section, we introduce a process-algebraic representation for extensive games
with perfect information in order to reduce the social large games into logarithmic
(or polylog) size proportional to the size of extensive representation of the same
games.
To analyse a game, we need to illustrate it with the game tree. If the number
of agents is too large then we may need to use a machinery to provide the game
tree illustration. We propose a machinery for this aim and call it process-game.
The process game is a combination of process theory and game theory for solving
games with large number of agents. We model the operation of each agent using
a process-game. Then, we run all of these process-games in parallel to obtain the
game tree.
Definition 15. Let A be a set of actions. The language L(A), is the smallest
superset of A? such that
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ρ, σ ∈ L(A)⇒ ¬ρ, (ρ ∨ σ),mid(σ), pre(σ), pos(σ) ∈ L(A).
Let T = (S,A,→, ↓, s0) be a transition system. For s ∈ S, the history of s,
denoted by h(s), is the trace σ ∈ A? such that s0
σ s. For a state (T, s) and a
formula σ ∈ L(A), we define the satisfaction (T, s) |= σ, as follows:
for σ ∈ A?, (T, s) |= σ iff h(s) = σ,
(T, s) |= pre(σ) iff ∃ρ ∈ A?(h(s) = σρ),
(T, s) |= mid(σ) iff ∃ρ, ς ∈ A?(h(s) = ςσρ),
(T, s) |= pos(σ) iff ∃ρ ∈ A?(h(s) = ρσ),
(T, s) |= (ρ ∨ σ) iff (T, s) |= ρ or (T, s) |= σ,
(T, s) |= ¬ρ iff (T, s) 6|= ρ.
Definition 16. Let A and B be two sets of actions. The set of conditional actions
over A with conditions in B, denoted by Acon(B) is defined as follows:
for each a ∈ A, and σ ∈ L(B), [σ]a is a conditional action, i.e., [σ]a ∈
Acon(B).
There is an injective mapping from A to Acon(B) which maps each a ∈ A to
[>]a ∈ Acon(B).
Definition 17 (Encapsulation of Conditional Actions). Let A and B be two sets
of actions and T = (S,Acon(B),→, ↓, s0) be a transition system over conditional
actions Acon(B). The encapsulation of conditional actions of T , written δ
c(T ), is
the transition system (S′, A′,→′, ↓′, s′0) where
• S′ = S, A′ = A, ↓′=↓, s′0 = s0 and
• for s, t ∈ S′ and a ∈ A, s a→ ′t iff for some σ ∈ L(B), s [σ]a→ t and (T, s) |= σ.
Now we give an example to illustrate the above definitions.
Example 5. Consider Example 3. We may consider two processes one for the
husband and one for the wife
husband := M + F (Figure 4(a)), and
wife := [M ]R+ [M ]W + [F ]R+ [F ]W (Figure 4(b)).
Finally, the transition system of the process δc(husband ‖ wife) is exactly the
tree of the game (Figure 2). Process algebraic form of the tree of the game is
M.(R+W ) + F.(R+W ).
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M F
(a) husband process
[M]R
[M]W [F]R
[F]W
(b) wife process
Figure 4: processes of Example 5
Definition 18. Let T = (S,A,→, ↓, s0). The transition system δ∪(T ) is a tran-
sition systems obtained from T by cutting some of its transitions in the following
way:
s
a→ t and b  a then s 6 b→
Assume we are given a Γ = 〈N,H,P, (Πi)〉 which is an extensive game with
perfect information. Now we model it using process theory as a process-game by
mapping each player (in N) to a process, each terminal state to a member of ↓,
and payoff function (Π) to profit value for each member of ↓.
Definition 19 (Process-game). Let Γ = 〈N,H,P, (Πi)〉 be an extensive game
with perfect information. A process-game model for Γ is a tupleP = 〈(Ti)i∈N , (pii)i∈N 〉
where each Ti = (S
i, Aicon(B),→i, ↓i, si0) is a transition systems and each pii : A? →
R is a profit function. A1, A2, . . . , An are conditioned by B (A1con(B), . . . , A
n
con(B))
so that
1. if i 6= j then Ai ∩Aj = ∅,
2. B = (
⋃
i∈N Ai) ∪A1 ×A2 × · · · ×An.
and the game Γ is mapped to process-game P so that
• Si is a set of states where at each state player i ∈ N , decides to perform
one of his/her possible actions which is determined by P for each node on
game tree,
• Ai is a set of actions containing an internal action τ that represents possible
actions of player i,
• →i⊆ Si ×Aicon(B) × Si is a set of transitions that represents what happens
when a player chooses one of his actions to do (using P ),
• ↓i⊆ Si is a set of successfully terminating states that represents terminal
states on game tree which can be defined by terminal histories (O(s)),
• pii : A? → R is a payoff function that represents payoff (Πi) for each action
of the player i in each subprocess (like a subgame) which is started by i.
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• si0 ∈ Si is set of initial states which player i can choose to start his game
from.
Now we can construct the process tree of the game using δ∪(δc(T1 ‖ T2 ‖ ... ‖
Tn)).
The sizes of Ai and N (set of players or agents) in Ti and pii are denoted by
|Ai|, n, and |pii| respectively. Let d = maxi(|Ai|) which is called the branching
factor of the process/game tree.
Theorem 3. Suppose a process-gameP = 〈(Ti)i∈N , (pii)i∈N 〉 with Ti = (Si, Aicon(B),→i
, ↓i, si0) is given. The size of the equivalent extensive representation of the P which
is denoted by |ERT | is O (dn+1).
Proof. The size of the extensive representation is equal to the size of the tree of the
game. As players act sequentially, the maximum number nodes in the first level
of the tree is |A1|, in the second level would be |A1| × |A2| and so on. Therefore,
we have
|ERT | ≤ |A1|+ |A1| × |A2|+ · · ·+ |A1| × |A2| × · · · × |An|
≤ d+ d2 + · · ·+ dn = O (dn+1) .

Theorem 4. The size of a given process-game P = 〈(Ti)i∈N , (pii)i∈N 〉 with Ti =
(Si, Aicon(B),→i, ↓i, si0) is O(nd|B|+
∑n
i=1 |pii|).
Proof. The size of P is equal to the sum of |Ti| and |pii| for all players. The size
of Ti is O(|Aicon(B)|). Therefore,
n∑
i=1
|Ti| ≤
n∑
i=1
|Aicon(B)| ≤
n∑
i=1
|Ai| × |B| ≤ nd|B|, (1)
|P| =
n∑
i=1
|Ti|+
n∑
i=1
|pii|. (2)
We can conclude from the equations 1 and 2 that
|P| = O(nd|B|+∑ni=1 |pii|).

Assume that each action of players are in the form of a or [b]a (without con-
dition or just with one condition) , therefore the size of B for each player is
O(d). According to Theorem 4, it is easy to see that the size of the process-game
representation would be O(nd2 +
∑n
i=1 |pii|). Based on the assumption, the size
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of the process-game can be logarithmic proportional to the size of the extensive
representation (as d is the maximum number of plsyers’ actions, it is a constant).
The following equation shows this fact.
|P| = O(nd2 +
n∑
i=1
|pii|) = O(log(dn) d
2
log(d)
+
n∑
i=1
|pii|) = O(log(|ERT |) +
n∑
i=1
|pii|).
Extended Version
We can extend the definition of process-game for extensive games with imperfect
information in the following manner.
Notation 5. Let A1 and A2 be two disjoint sets. For (a, b) ∈ (A1 ∪ 2A1)× (A2 ∪
2A2), we define a∪˙b :=
{a} ∪ {b} if (a, b) ∈ A1 ×A2,
{a} ∪ b if (a, b) ∈ A1 × 2A2 ,
{b} ∪ a if (a, b) ∈ 2A1 ×A2,
a ∪ b if (a, b) ∈ 2A1 × 2A2 .
Using the above notation, we modify definition 11 over n disjoint sets of actions
in the following.
Definition 20. Let A1, A2, . . . , An be n disjoint sets of actions. γ : (A1 ∪ 2A1)×
(A2∪2A2)×· · ·× (An∪2An)→ 2A1∪A2∪···∪An is a communication function which
is defined γ(a1, a2, . . . , an) := a1∪˙a2∪˙ · · · ∪˙an for all (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ (A1∪2A1)×
(A2 ∪ 2A2)× · · · × (An ∪ 2An).
We may extend γ to the set of conditional actions in the manner as in the
following definition:
Definition 21. Let A1, A2, B be three disjoint sets of actions. γ is a commu-
nication function over conditional actions A1con(B) and A
2
con(B) for ([σ]a, [σ]b) ∈
A1con(B) ×A2con(B) which is defined as follows:
γ([σ]a, [ρ]b) := [σ ∧ ρ]γ(a, b).
This communication function helps to model simultaneous players’ moves in
extensive games with imperfect information (See Example 4).
Example 6. The process of each player in Example 4 is as given below:
wife := (H +N).(R+W ),
husband := [H]M + [H]F .
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Husband, Wife
2,1 0,0 0,0 1,2
Wife
H N
0,0
{M,R} {M,W} {F,R} {F,W}
Figure 5: This figure shows simultaneous moving of wife and husband in the second
level of the game and equivalent to Figure 3.
and γ is defined over Aw = {R,W}, Ahcon(B) = {[H]M, [H]F}, and B = {H}.
γ([H]M,R), for instance, is equal to [H]{M,R}. The transition system of the
process over γ communication function is δc(wife ‖ husband) which is exactly
the tree of the game. The tree is shown in Figure 5 which is equivalent to Figure 3.
Now, we can define the extended process-game by a tupleP = 〈(Ti)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , γ〉
for a given extensive game with imperfect information Γ = 〈N,H,P, (Ii), (Πi)〉.
Relative to the definition of a process-game, the new element is the γ as a com-
munication function over A1, A2, . . . , An which are conditioned by B. Definition
of γ is based on Ii.
In the extended version, the process/game tree is constructed with the same
method as in process-game (δ∪(δc(T1 ‖ T2 ‖ ... ‖ Tn))). Also, if the size of γ is
denoted by |γ|, we have
|P| =
n∑
i=1
|Ti|+
n∑
i=1
|pii|+ |γ|. (3)
Similar theorems for extended process-game can be proved by replacing equation 3
in those theorems.
Applications
One of the application of process-game in representing the real social extensive
games in log or polylog size could be in modeling of social systems where agents
have local interaction and local competition (these two terms might be used inter-
changeably, conform to this article). A significant approach which works on the
assumption of local interaction is generative social science.
Generative social science [Epstein, 2006] is an approach to study social systems
via agent-based computational models. Its aim is to answer that how the regu-
larity of the society emerges from local interaction of heterogeneous autonomous
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agents. One of the main assumptions of generative social science is called “local
interaction” (see [Epstein, 2006], Page 6). Base on this assumption, agents in-
teract with their neighbors and compete in the social network, in which they are
involved.
On the other hand, social extensive games–each player is viewed as being
involved in a local competition with the players in geographically neighboring
regions–can be modeled as a graph G [Kearns, Littman, and Singh, 2001]. In the
graph-based model, each player is represented by a vertex inG. The interpretation
of edges is that each player is in a game only with the respective neighbors in G.
In the above ven, it can be proposed that lots of social systems are based on
local interactions and competitions. The observation forwarded below stipulates
that in considering local interaction in the form of extensive games, the size of the
process-game can be logarithmic in comparison with the extensive representation.
Observation 1. Suppose there is an extensive game with perfect information
and interaction graph-based model G. The maximum degree of G is denoted by
∆. Actions of each player are limited just to the player’s neighbors in G (the
size of B in the equivalent process-game would be O(d∆)). Hence, the size of the
process-game representation would be O(nd∆+1 +
∑n
i=1 |pii|). As a consequence,
we have
|P| = O(nd∆+1 +
n∑
i=1
|pii|) = O(log(dn) d
∆+1
log(d)
+
n∑
i=1
|pii|) =
O(
d∆+1
log(d)
log(|ERT |) +
n∑
i=1
|pii|).
As d,∆  n is a common situation in social extensive games, the size of the
process-game can be logarithmic (or polylog, depending on d and ∆) with respect
to the size of the extensive representation. For instance, considering local com-
petition property, we have ∆ = O(log(n)), then d
∆+1
log(d) = O(n) = O(log(|ERT |)).
Therefore, |P| = O(log2(|ERT |) +∑ni=1 |pii|).
Note that local competition is kind of local interaction. Recalling the assumption
of local interaction in generative social science, we can come to the conclusion
that it is obvious that in lots of social systems ∆ = O(log(n)).
There have been various representations of extensive games aiming to repre-
sent the large games compactly, such as the graphical model [Kearns, Littman,
and Singh, 2001] and MAIDs [Koller and Milch, 2003]. However, our proposal
(originating from the process theory) of producing a compact representation, is
quite different. Also, we bring the advantages of process theory (in execution and
management) to the game theory environment.
Our model can be applied in management of complex systems too, but how?
Each process has its own profit and each profit is a function of some inputs.
Suppose a process game is defined with some initial values and may deliver some
equilibria path as a result (using the algorithm of the following section). However,
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for a manager, it would be critical to control the path as he wants it to be.
Therefore he can try changing the inputs (so the profits will be changed, leading
also to some new equilibria path) up to getting the best one.
4 The Algorithm
The notion of process-game has been explained completely in the previous section.
As strategies and agents in the process-game are the same as in its equivalent
extensive game, therefore the subgame perfect equilibrium (or equilibrium path)
is a solution concept for the process-game, too. Now, in this section, we propose an
algorithm to find the equilibrium path in a process-game. Algorithm 1 illustrates
the finding of equilibria path under the assumption that there exists only one
equilibrium path for each subprocess (like a subgame).
Remark 1. Equilibrium path in a process-game P = 〈(Ti)i∈N , (pii)i∈N 〉 is a
sequence of actions from s10 (suppose player 1 starts the entirely of the game) to
↓n (suppose the last action is for player n).
In line 1 of Algorithm 1, expansion takes place by virtue of conditional actions.
As in Algorithm 1, each player’s payoff value is calculated bottom-up, it is suffi-
cient to save players’ payoff in the subprocess equilibria at each level. To reuse
space and keep the space required by the algorithm linear, we delete all process
nodes which are expanded in that subprocess previously in line 11 of Algorithm 1.
We present below an example, meant to clarify how this algorithm works.
Example 7. Two people select a policy that affects them both by alternately
vetoing the available (voted) policies until only one remains. First person 1 ve-
toes a policy. If more than one policy remains, person 2 then vetoes a policy.
If more than one policy still remains, person 1 then vetoes another policy. The
process continues until only one policy has not been vetoed. Suppose there are
three possible policies, X, Y , and Z, person 1 prefers X to Y to Z, and person
2 prefers Z to Y to X [Osborne, 2004]. Now, we want to represent this situation
through the process-game, as a compact representation proportional to the exten-
sive model. To define a process-game P = 〈(Ti)i∈{1,2}, (pii)i∈{1,2}, γ〉, we should
first determine the transition system Ti. Players’ process model is specified below,
with P1 and P2 being the processes of person 1 and person 2, respectively. T1
and T2 can be obtained by decoding theses process models.
P1 := X + Y + Z
P2 := [X]Y + [X]Z + [Y ]X + [Y ]Z + [Z]X + [Z]Y
Definitions of pi1 and pi2 are based on the players’ preferences. The payoff function
of each player on each subprocess is equal to the player’s payoff over the complete
path from the root to the leaf, passing through the subprocess. This path for
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Algorithm 1 Depth-First Finding Equilibria
Input: A Process-Game P = 〈(Ti)i∈N , (pii)i∈N 〉
Output: Equilibria path Λ
1: for sij ← each state visited in depth-first expansion of P from s10 using
Aicon(B) do
2: isV isited[sij ]← false
3: ratPath[sij ]← ∅
4: if sij ∈↓n then
5: isV isited[sij ]← true
6: else
7: if ∀s′, a : (sij , a, s′) ∈→i ∧ isV isited[s′] then
8: a← arg maxa pii(a.ratPath[s′]) B sij a→ s′ ∈→i
B choose a possible action a ∈ Aicon(B) from state sij ∈ Si which
maximizes profit
of player i in the state sij
9: ratPath[sij ]← a.ratPath[s′]
10: isV isited[sij ]← true
B the assumption is just one equilibria path exists for each subprocess
11: delete the ratPath for all s′.
B by deleting ratPath for s′ the space complexity will remain linear
and ratPath
propagated toward s10 states.
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: return ratPath[s10]
each subprocess p is denoted by path(p). Therefore,
pi1(p) =
 2 if there is no X in the path(p)1 if there is no Y in the path(p)
0 if there is no Z in the path(p)
,
pi2(p) =
 2 if there is no Z in the path(p)1 if there is no Y in the path(p)
0 if there is no X in the path(p)
.
Actually, we define the above functions compactly. Thus, their space complexity
is much lower than when defining the function for each path separately. Now, let
us compute the Nash equilibrium. We know that the process tree is constructed
completely by δ∪(δc(P1 ‖ P2)). However, using Algorithm 1, the process tree is
expanded step by step to save the space. The steps of the DFS expansion of the
process tree are sketched in Figure 6.
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Player 1
Player 2
X Y Z
[X]Y [X]Z
0,2 1,1
Player 1 Player 1
Player 2
X Y Z
X Y Z
[Y ]X [Y ]Z
0,2 2,0
ratPath : Y
X Y Z
ratPath : Y
[Z]X [Z]Y
1,1 2,0
ratPath : X
0,2 0,2 0,2
X Y Z
ratPath : Y ratPath : X
0,2 0,2
ratPath : X
1,1
ratPath : ZX
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
(f) (g)
Figure 6: (a) to (g) show the steps of Algorithm 1 in finding the Nash equilibrium for
the process model of Example 7. At step (g) the rational path of the s10 (ZX) is the
Nash equilibrium.
As it is not necessary existing any pure equilibrium path for an extensive
game with imperfect information, this algorithm is not working for the extended
process-game. However, we can detect the situation in the bottom-up calculation
and report “no pure equilibrium path”.
Complexity
Time complexity of Algorithm 1 in worst case would be in the NP-complete com-
plexity class, like for backward induction [Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazi-
rani, 2007] (because we want to find pure Nash equilibria). Its space complexity
is linear in the size of the game which is given as an input i.e., linear in the depth
of the process-game, maximum number of actions which are possible to do by a
player, and the size of the payoff function.
In the extended version, if the number of simultaneous moves grows, the ex-
tensive game will be transforming to the pure strategic form, so that in the worst
18
case, its space complexity would be exponential.
The algorithm is like a depth-first search and the space complexity of depth-first
search is O(hd), here h is the height of the tree and d is the branching factor that
is the maximum number of actions which a player can do. However, there is a
bottleneck which is caused by the size of the payoff function. If it has exponential
size, as space complexity is linear with respect to the size of the payoff function
too, it will be exponential too. Therefore, the algorithm will be better than back-
ward induction or using strategic form algorithms in terms of space complexity
under two circumstances. First, the size of the payoff function is polynomial on n
and d. Second, the size of simultaneous moves (required size to represent function
of γ) is polynomial in n and d (in the case of extended version).
Theorem 6. For a given extended process-game P = 〈(Ti)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , γ〉 as an
input, the space complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(nd+ |P|).
Proof. At each step of Algorithm 1, one process node is expanded and finally col-
lapsed when all its subnodes are visited. Therefore, when Algorithm 1 is running,
at all levels of the tree, at most one node is expanded. We know that the height
of the tree is at most n and the branching factor of the tree is d. Therefore,
the allocated space for expanding the process tree during the running in all steps
would be O(nd) in the worst case. Hence, the space complexity of the algorithm
is O(nd+ size of input) = O(nd+ |P|). 
Actually, the process-game is a simple case of the extended process-game with
|γ| = 0. Hence, the above theorem is in a general case true for the process-game,
too.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
We introduced a new model to represent large extensive games in a compact rep-
resentation (specially social extensive games with local competition). In addition,
the model is defined in algebraic terms and can be ran in parallel mode. Further,
we provide an algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium for this representation in
linear space complexity, with respect to the size of the input.
As we mentioned, one of the applications of the model can be in management
of complex systems. However, there is no software to facilitate the management
process for the manager. Therefore, the next step of the work may be develop a
software to approach this particular goal.
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